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Central clearing and the role of central counterparties (CCP) has gained on importance in the 
financial sector, since counterparty risk of the trading is to be managed by them. The 
regulation has turned towards them lately, by defining several processes, how CCPs should 
measure and manage their risk. Stress situation is an important term of the regulation, 
however it is not specified clearly, how stress should be identified. This paper provides a 
possible definition of stress event based on the existing risk management methodology: the 
usage of risk measure oversteps, and investigates the potential stress periods of the last years 
on the Hungarian stock market. According to the results the definition needs further 
calibration based on the magnitude of the cross-sectional data. The paper examines 
furthermore whether stress is to be predicted from market liquidity. The connection of 
liquidity and market turmoil proved to be contrary to the expectations; liquidity shortage was 
rather a consequence, than a forecaster phenomenon in the tested period. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Trading with financial instruments on stock exchanges or on over-the-counter (OTC) markets 
used to differ in the management of counterparty risk. All trades on the organised markets are 
settled through a central counterparty, while the settlement of OTC trading used to be cleared 
bilaterally. Nowadays this difference is disappearing, due to the new market infrastructure 
regulation. Central counterparties, acting as trading partner in each trade, take over 
counterparty risk, namely the risk that one of the parties will not perform as promised. Since 
the counterparty risk is a notable risk category, CCPs should measure and manage their risk 
efficiently, in order to maintain the market’s financial stability, as bankruptcy of a CCP would 
have a serious effect on the whole financial sector. Consequently the new regulation: the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the USA, accepted by the United States Congress, and the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR, Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories4) in the EU, accepted on 4th July, 2012 by the 
European Parliament and the Council, focuses the risk management of the CCPs with special 
care.  
The focus of this paper is the EMIR regulation, since the analysed data stem from the 
Hungarian financial market. EMIR and its supplementation aim to ensure the prudence of the 
risk management procedure of the central counterparties, however in some cases EMIR is not 
specific enough, and doesn’t give an exact solution how to interpret some notions, like one of 
its key terms: the stress situation. The proper definition is important, as according to the 
regulation, the different applications of certain models are based on whether a financial stress 
is present on the market or not. 
In this paper a definition for stress situation is presented, based on the results of the backtest 
of the applied risk measurement model, and the consequences of applying the definition is 
investigated on real market data of the Hungarian stock exchange, the Budapest Stock 
Exchange (BSE), in the after crisis period, between 2010 and 2013. We do not build a general 
stress index for the financial sector, or analyse the market under stress as Berlinger et al. 
(2011), we just define stress based on the risk management system of a clearing house, since 
it is the most simplest and straightforward way to define stress. The general stress indices of 
the literature like the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI) of Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009); Financial Stress Indicator of Canada (FSI) by Illing and Liu (2006); Composite 
Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) of Hollo et al. (2012); or the Financial Stability Index by 
Bordo et al. (2000) also could have been applied for defining stress event, but these general 
stress indices usually do not take into account the special features of the clearing industry5. 
Besides defining stress in this paper, we also analyse whether the identified stress events 
would have been predictable from the (il)liquidity of the market.  
The paper is built up as following: the regulation and its elements referring to stress are 
introduced in the second section. The third section contains the risk and liquidity 
measurement methodology used in the model and the empirical research: the analysis of stress 
events and its co-movement with liquidity.  
                                                          
4 This regulation was supplemented by the European Commission on 19th December, 2012, with the Regulation 
(EU) No 153/2013, providing the technical standards of the EMIR regulation. 
5 See Berlinger et al (2015). 
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2 THE REGULATION 
The main risk, CCPs are facing, derives from the default of their clearing parties. For taking 
over this risk, CCPs apply a waterfall system of collateral elements that decreases their losses, 
if one of the parties fails to fulfil its obligations. The first component ensuring the 
performance of the trading parties is an initial margin, a certain amount of cash or cash-
equivalent that is required to be placed by both parties - the seller and the buyer - of the trade. 
As the definition of stress in the analysis is based on the shortfall of the initial margin, only 
this part of the collateral system is introduced in more details. The concept of determining its 
level is regulated by EMIR and the 153/2013 regulation.  
 
2.1 Model of margin determination 
The regulation says, that ‘a CCP shall calculate the initial margins to cover the exposures 
arising from market movements for each financial instrument that is collateralised on a 
product basis’ (Regulation 153/2013/EU, Article 24). The regulators do not define the models 
the CCPs shall use. The only limitations they give are the following: 
1. CCP has to use a 99% confidence interval in case of financial instruments other than OTC 
derivatives, and 99.5% for OTC derivatives (Regulation 153/2013/EU, Article 24).  
2. For estimating the model CCPs shall use the data at least of the latest 12 months’ data 
(Regulation 153/2013/EU, Article 25). 
3. CCPs shall take into account the time horizon for the liquidation period, which shall be two 
days for financial instruments other than OTC derivatives, and five days for OTC 
derivatives (Regulation 153/2013/EU, Article 26). 
The most widespread risk measure used also by the Basel rules – regulating financial 
institutions – is the Value-at-Risk (VaR), and because of its popularity and applicability for 
the purposes of the EMIR, it was applied by most of the CCPs, too. The features, 
shortcomings and alternatives of VaR are introduced in details in the next section. 
 
2.2 Time horizon for historical volatility 
The regulation requires a period of at least 12 months to be used to estimate the historical 
volatility. Besides that the regulation requires further specification in order to be prepared for 
even extreme market circumstances, by prescribing a ‘full range of market conditions, 
including periods of stress’ (Regulation 153/2013/EU, Article 25). 
This means, that the definition of stress has an effect on the observation period the CCP shall 
use to calculate the model, and also on the calculated volatility and margin level. 
 
2.3 Procyclicality 
The financial crisis shed light on the possible procyclical effect of the risk management 
regulations in the financial sector. The models using more rigorous capital requirements in 
case of market turbulences contributed to the financial difficulties of the institutions and 
deepened even the crisis. Consequently the latest direction of the macroprudencial regulations 
aims to minimise that effect by applying anticyclical provisions. 
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That was formulated in Regulation 153/2013/EU: ‘A CCP shall ensure that its policy for 
selecting and revising the confidence interval, the liquidation period and the lookback period 
deliver forward looking, stable and prudent margin requirements that limit procyclicality to 
the extent that the soundness and financial security of the CCP is not negatively affected’ 
(Regulation 153/2013/EU, Article 28). To achieve this goal, the regulator requires the CCPs 
to use a margin buffer at least equal to 25%, when calculating margin in normal market 
conditions. On the other hand, in case of changing market conditions, which would cause an 
essential rise in the margin requirements, the CCP can disregard the margin buffer. This 
procedure is to be used in stress situation that depends on the definition of stress, also. 
 
 
3 MODELLING STRESS 
The present practice of most CCPs relies on the decision of the risk management committee 
when deciding about the existence of stress. Although this method provides flexibility that is 
necessary in crisis, it is suggested to define some objective criteria that give a signal when 
market may be regarded in stress.  
As the risk measurement models are reviewed and tested on a daily basis, the results of these 
backtests are suggested to be used as a warning signal about stress. If the real market change 
exceeds the maximal movement based on the applied risk measure (VaR) for one or more 
main products, the situation is to be analysed further as stress situation is assumable. 
 
3.1 Risk measuring models 
A risk measure is defined as a function that assigns a scalar to a random variable quantifying a 
certain loss. In the models of the capital market, standard deviation is used to quantify risk, 
but for risk management purposes measures focusing on the downside outcomes are more 
appropriate.  
Value-at-Risk (VaR) was defined by JP Morgan in the mid 90’s, as the maximum loss of the 
portfolio over a predefined time horizon (T) at a given significance level () under normal 
circumstances. VaR can be expressed either in absolute value or as a percentage of the 
portfolio value (Jorion, 2007). Because of its simplicity VaR was adopted by the whole 
financial sector, even though the regulation of the financial institutions – Basel Rules – uses it 
in the risk management systems, or in defining treasury trading limits (Walter, 2002), since it 
is easy to use and to understand. In order to calculate VaR, the probability distribution of the 
position in the certain security/portfolio at time T is to be modelled. 
The (1-α)th percentile of this distribution shows the threshold value (K) the portfolio 
underperforms with a probability of (1-α) at time T (Jorion, 2007), as it is shown in Equation 
(1).  
 
𝑃(𝑉𝑡 < 𝐾) ≤ 1 − 𝛼     (1) 
 
where the value of the position is V at time t. 
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Value-at-Risk is given as the difference of the actual value and the threshold.  
There are 3 main concepts to calculate VaR: historical calculation, analytical method and 
Structured Monte Carlo Simulation (Jorion, 2007). In the framework of the historical method, 
the events of a chosen reference period are supposed to describe the potential future 
outcomes, so the whole distribution is given by them. The analytical method assumes the 
knowledge of the distribution, and as it is provided in most of the cases to be normal, this 
method is also called delta-normal method. 
The third possibility to determine the distribution is simulation that can rely either on 
historical data or on the knowledge of the value generating process. 
Although VaR is not a coherent risk measure, as it was presented by Artzner et al. (1999), and 
a coherent alternative6 was suggested by Acerbi and Tasche (2002), it is still the most 
commonly used risk measure in the financial sector. Even if EMIR does not restrict the circle 
of the applied risk measures to VaR, most CCPs use VaR for risk management, to measure 
their risk and to calculate margin requirements. 
 
3.2 Measurement of liquidity 
The predictability of financial difficulties or even crisis would be very important for both 
micro- and macroeconomic perspectives. As financial stress is often attended by liquidity 
shortages, the question arises, whether liquidity can be used as an indicator of the forthcoming 
stress. 
The notion of liquidity has several interpretations, like the liquidity of a company, the 
liquidity of the whole financial system, or the liquidity of the market. In each different 
interpretation liquidity is to be measured differently and so the management of illiquidity risk 
differs too. This paper focuses on the concept of market liquidity that is defined by the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) as: ‘Liquid markets are defined as markets where 
participants can rapidly execute large-volume transactions with little impact on prices.’ (BIS, 
1999) 
The definition of liquidity suggests that its concept is very complex, there does not even exist 
a single best way to measure its value. A broad overview of liquidity indicators is provided by 
von Wyss (2004). The liquidity indicators can be grouped into three main categories (Csávás 
and Erhart, 2005): (1) indicators of transaction costs, (2) indicators of volumes, (3) indicators 
of prices.  
The liquidity indicator used in the analysis is the Budapest Liquidity Measure (BLM), that is 
based on transactions cost, since it is a cost of roundtrip type of indicator. The first liquidity 
measure of this type was the Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) created by the Deutsche Börse 
Group in 2002, by Gomber and Schweikert (2002). The same measure was introduced on the 
Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) under the name of Budapest Liquidity Measure (BLM) in 
2005 (Kutas and Végh, 2005, Gyarmati et al. 2010). These liquidity measures are weighted 
spread measures that represent the implicit costs of trading, arising from the fact that actual 
trading is not executed at the mid-price.  
                                                          
6 Even coherent risk measures face risk allocation problems as presented in Csóka-Pintér (2016). 
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A simpler version of this liquidity measure is the relative spread, which can be computed 
according to Equation (2):  
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where pi
Ask denotes the best ask, and pt
Bid  the best bid price in the order book at time t. This 
measure displays the loss realized when buying and then immediately selling the same asset, 
relative to the mid-price (average of the best bid and ask price in the order book). 
Basically, the BLM is a version of the relative spread measure. The difference is, that in case 
of the relative spread, only the best ask and bid price appear in the calculation, while in case 
of BLM we take into account that an order is not necessarily fulfilled on the best price levels.  
The calculation of BLM is shown in Equation (3): 
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where pt,i
Ask(Bid) shows the ith best price on the ask(bid) side at time t , whereas qt,i
Ask(Bid) 
denotes the depth of (the overall quantity submitted to) that same price level. pi
Mid is the mid-
price at time t. 
An interpretation for the calculation of a BLM type liquidity measure is shown on Figure (1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Calcutation of the Liquidity Measure 
Source: Gomber and Schweikert (2002), p. 3. 
 
In sum, the smaller these measures, the higher the liquidity of the asset. 
The Budapest Stock Exchange calculates this measure every time when there is a change in 
the order book, and also on a daily basis. The daily BLM value is the average of the intraday 
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BLM data. The BSE publishes these daily data at the end of every month in order to provide 
information for the market. 
 
3.3 Empirical test of stress 
In order to test the suggested stress-definition, we took the real market data of the Budapest 
Stock Exchange. A daily risk measure (VaR) was calculated and stress signal was identified, 
if the market movement on the next day exceeded the VaR value.  
The daily closing prices of the bluechip stocks of the Budapest Stock Exchange, namely, the 
OTP, MOL, Richter, MTelekom were used in the analyzed in a 4 years period, between 
January 2010 and December 20137. In finance the daily (log)return of financial assets are 
regarded to be a stationer random variable whose realisations derive from independent, 
identical distribution. Despite of some stylised facts (e.g. fat tail phenomena), daily logreturn 
is assumed to be normally distributed in most of the models. Following the literature, we 
calculate the daily logreturn (y) of the stocks, according to the Equation (4):  
 
)ln(
1

t
t
t S
S
y      (4) 
 
where S denotes the stock price and the indices stand for the time. 
The Value-at-Risk for each day is calculated according to the delta-normal method, the 
parameters of the return generating process are calculated as the average (µ) and standard 
deviation (σ) of the logreturns in the previous 250 days, as it is shown in Equation (5): 
 
   )1(1VaR       (5) 
 
where Φ-1 denotes the inverse of the cumulated distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution. 
After having the logreturn and the VaR for every day, those days are to be investigated 
further, where the real price fall exceeds the VaR of the previous day that should happen in 1-
α percent of the cases, as a consequence of the VaR-definition. The significance level (α) is 
99%, as it is prescribed by EMIR. Figure (2) illustrates the calculation in case of MOL, the 
Hungarian Oil company, representing almost one third of the Hungarian stock market. 
                                                          
7 BSE calculated and published the daily BLM data only until December 2013, after switching to Xetra trading 
system, these data are not available. 
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The points below the red line show the days, when the negative price movement exceeded the 
maximal loss predicted by VaR with a probability of 99%. These days are to be examined 
further in order to decide about stress, according to our suggestion. 
 
 
Figure 2: The daily logreturns and VaR of MOL between 2010 and 2013. 
Source: calculation based on the data of BSE. 
 
As the outlying points can be caused by company specific reasons, we searched for the 
outlying days for all 4 stocks, in order to find those periods, when more assets give a warning 
signal. According to the VaR model the number of the outlying days should sum up to 1 
percent, so 10 days out of the 1000 working days during the period. We found 8-15 outliers 
for each of the tested group of stocks – the least, 8 in case of MTelekom, and the most, 15 in 
case of OTP. This result supports the applicability of the VaR model, as even in case of MOL, 
the difference is insignificant. 
-10,00%
-5,00%
0,00%
5,00%
10,00%
15,00%
Daily logreturn VaR
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The potential stress days are depicted on Figure (3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Stress signals of 4 Bluechips between 2010 and 2013. 
Source: calculation based on the data of BSE. 
 
The only date when all the 4 tested papers signalled, was the 6th of May 2010, when a sudden 
fall on the New York Stock Exchange due to technical problems caused worldwide market 
turbulences. Even then the market calmed down rapidly, so it is not reasonable to speak about 
a stress period.  
Two other dates are worth investigating in the period, because 3 of the 4 stocks (except for 
MTelekom) signalled. The market fall of 8-9th of August 2011 was a consequence of global 
markets’ events. In September 2011 the possibility to pay back foreign denominated mortgage 
loan at out-of market exchange rate forced to the Hungarian banking sector caused the 
extreme price movement, but these days were also followed by some correction, that offset 
the losses of the previous market collapse. The further warning dates are triggered by single 
stocks, so they are not to be interpreted as stress period in the market. Based on the above, we 
can state, that the examined period of the last 4 years was characterised by quiet market 
movements and free of stress. 
Even if we have not found evidence of a real stress, it is worth to analyse the market liquidity 
in the periods of the signalling days. For the purpose to quantify liquidity we used the daily 
value of the Budapest Liquidity Measure, for the same stocks and for the same time period as 
in the case of the daily logreturn calculation. The time series are given by the Budapest Stock 
Exchange. BLM refers to the cost of trading a certain amount, expressed in basis points, in the 
calculations we used the 20.000 euro BLM figures, referring to the cost of trading in that 
volume. The time series of BLM need to be differentiated also in order to get stationer data, 
consequently we calculated the daily change of BLM. As the liquidity shortage is indicated by 
MOL
OTP
MTELEKOM
RICHTER
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growing BLM figures, similarly to the stress calculation, we looked for those days, when the 
daily change exceeded the 99% maximum of the previous 1 year period. We had access to 
BLM figures from 2010, so the analysed time-series shortened to 3 years because of the 
reference period. 
For the purpose to quantify liquidity we used the daily value of the Budapest Liquidity 
Measure, for the same stocks and for the same time period as in the case of the daily logreturn 
calculation. The time series derive from the Budapest Stock Exchange. 
The delta normal method cannot be applied, since the daily differences of BLM are not 
normal, as shown on the example of MOL on Figure (4). The rejection of normality was 
confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also (with a p-value of 0,000). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of the daily BLM differences of MOL between 2010-2013. 
Source: calculation based on the data of BSE. 
 
Therefore, we applied the historical method to calculate Value-at-Risk characteristic risk 
measure for BLM. We took the 99% percentile of the data, and warning signal was defined as 
those days, when the daily change of BLM exceeded the 99% percentile of the previous 250 
days. 
First, we examined the signals of the liquidity measure in the two periods – August and 
September 2011 - identified by stock returns.  
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OTP MOL 
Stock_return BLM Stock_return BLM 
22.09.2011  09.09.2011  
21.09.2011  08.09.2011  
20.09.2011 12.09.2011 02.09.2011  
08.09.2011 09.09.2011   
17.08.2011 18.08.2011 09.08.2011 11.08.2011 
09.08.2011  08.08.2011 09.08.2011 
 
Table 1:Signalling dates of MOL and RICHTER between 2011-2013. 
Source: calculation based on the data of BSE. 
 
The BLM of RICHTER gave no signals at all, and MTELEKOM had no extreme price fall in 
the period, so only the stress dates of MOL and OTP are shown in Table 1. We can see, that 
merely about the half of the warning dates were accompanied by a liquidity signal, and even 
in these cases the liquidity measure signs followed the market fall, instead of predicting it. It 
seems as if market participants withdraw their orders after the price fall of the market and not 
the reduction of the order book causes the fall of the prices. The other warning signals of 
BLM in the period appeared independently from the extreme market movements. 
An explanation of the results can be the lack of real stress in the analysed 4 years period, 
therefore the highest changes in price and liquidity are independent from each other. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Based on the recent direction of the regulation of financial markets and institutions, in this 
paper an objective reference for defining stress situation was suggested. As the empirical 
analysis showed, applying VaR oversteps as stress signals has also some subjective elements, 
and further investigation of the market is needed in order to decide whether a real stress exists 
or extreme movements were caused by individual events. There were 3 dates identified in the 
reference period, when at least 3 of the 4 analysed stocks alarmed for stress simultaneously. 
The paper analysed furthermore the connection between the above defined stress signal and 
market liquidity. No strict connection of the price and liquidity movement was found. In 
contrast to the expectations, the liquidity shortage rather followed the extreme price changes, 
than predicted it. The market movements of the tested period – between 2010 and 2013 – 
proved to be very quiet that can explain the results.  
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